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Introduction
Air-Sea Battle is an emerging operational concept borne of the growing complexities of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) challenges throughout the world, seemingly with emphasis in the Asia-Pacific region. 2 The concept seeks to ensure strategic reach and cross-domain operational maneuverability and flexibility for the joint force, if called upon by the National Command Authority (NCA) to achieve objectives in support of national strategy. Air-Sea Battle is receiving increasing scrutiny in defense and policy circles due to the ostensible American rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,
as a nested component of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff new Joint
Operational Access Concept. 3 After a decade-plus of United States (U.S.) involvement in protracted, low-intensity conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Air-Sea Battle is emerging as a potential operational concept to gain and maintain access for the joint force.
Compared to recent U.S. military operations over the last decade, Air-Sea Battle represents a more conventional force posture and way of employment, presupposing high intensity nation-state versus nation-state conflict in a contested environment.
Somewhat analogous to Air-Sea Battle is the Air-Land Battle doctrine, which ultimately yielded the outstanding synergy and lethality of the joint combined arms maneuver force, tested and proven in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the subsequent invasion of 2 Iraq in 2003. 4 However, the Air-Land Battle doctrine emerged in the specter of an overwhelming and defined Soviet conventional arms threat to Western Europe.
Air-Sea Battle in its current conceptual state may assist in informing national strategy, yet it does not represent a strategy or doctrine by itself. 5 An examination of ends, ways and means, balanced by risk, domestic political considerations and feasibility, acceptability and suitability, may or may not embrace Air-Sea Battle as a way to assist in achieving American national grand strategy. Quite simply, materiel components of the concept may be prohibitively expensive given the U.S.'s current fiscal crisis. Any military concept or strategy must be affordable to the nation, lest the nation risk spending considerable treasure on force structure, which may be economically detrimental to the nation. 6 The tension between military strategy and means that are "good enough," must be balanced with the current American desire to spend lesser amounts on defense. Keep in mind that effective, enduring strategies must address uncertainty, especially in the military realm. 7 Given current and longer-term fiscal uncertainties facing the U.S., the Air-Sea
Battle concept contributes to the defense debate and narrative in an evocative manner.
However, its narrative resonates differently to various constituencies and stakeholders, including the American people, Congress, foreign governments, the defense industry, the military branches, and many other interested parties. This monograph will consider the merits of Air-Sea Battle through the lens of national grand strategy, and the concept's implications for the defense narrative. Included is an examination of background, assumptions, current national guidance, where the narrative resides by service, and recommendations for the future Air-Sea Battle narrative, to include how it can best inform the U.S. national debate and defense expenditures.
Background and Assumptions
At its core, Air-Sea Battle is about preserving and maintaining access across the domains of warfare. Although A2/AD is the current terminology, denial of adversary strategic reach, access and the ability to maneuver is ageless; examples of A2/AD appear throughout history. During World War II, German Kriegsmarine submarine "Wolfpacks" wreaked havoc on Allied shipping in the North Atlantic, severely curtailing oceanic, bulk resupply of the Allied powers. 8 Similarly, the A2/AD threat posed by North
Vietnamese anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles made North Vietnam the most heavily defended piece of territory in the world during the 1960s and early 1970s.
American airpower losses due to these North Vietnamese air defenses were sobering, as were Israeli Air Force losses early in the Yom Kippur War for similar reasons. In the current environment, the U.S. national leaders have articulated various policy statements on her enduring interests without articulating a specific national grand strategy. 18 The most authoritative guidance on strategy is embodied in the January 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance. While not at the national grand strategy level, it is adequate for military leaders to plan for emerging threats and ensure necessary capabilities are resident in the joint force. Not having a national grand strategy ensures U.S. response options remain open in the event of crisis, but an inherent risk of this absence could be strategic paralysis at the onset of crisis, or worse, an ill-advised, erratic reaction to potential threats. A somewhat predictable U.S. strategy may provide "off-ramp" opportunities for adversary nations or actors in the event of a crisis.
Conversely, a less-defined strategy may cause overreaction or strategic miscue to adversaries. Air-Sea Battle can inform national grand strategy, provide options to the NCA, and assist in maintaining vital access to U.S. national interests.
Since Air-Sea Battle is about preserving U.S. strategic options, access and freedom of maneuver for the joint force, the concept must orient toward protecting and ensuring access to the global commons, whether air, sea, cyber or space. For example, 50% of the world's seaborne tonnage passes through the South China Sea. 19 The global sea lines of communication interleaving the region are vital to the global economy and U.S. interests. 20 Correspondingly, 40% of the world's "traded crude oil" passes through the Persian Gulf and its critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. 21 The inability to ensure access in either of these regions could cause ruinous economic effects.
Of perhaps even more immediate concern is safe, reliable, secure access to the cyber domain, along with associated communications access provided through the space domain, via 1,100 satellites and an estimated 9,000 on-orbit transponders by 2015. 22 Although somewhat difficult to envisage, the cyber domain carries an extraordinary amount of data daily which feeds the world economy, ensures worldwide connectivity between people (thereby lessening the importance of borders and nationalities), ensures the operation of banking, transportation, and utility systems, and order to preserve money for weapon system acquisition. Hence, for several years, the Air Force strategy has revolved around "trading size to maintain a quality force, and staying focused on readiness and modernization," in an endeavor to avoid a hollow force. 40 With the Asia-Pacific rebalance and the advent of Air-Sea Battle, the service force structure and acquisition desires will be favorably impacted. At present, some 60%
of Air Force units based outside the continental U.S. reside in the Asia-Pacific region. 41 Beyond basing, Air-Sea Battle provides an impetus to upgrade an aging fleet in order to be equipped and relevant when America calls on the service to defend her interests.
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The current Navy narrative is best summarized by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert's three tenets: "Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be
Ready." 43 Much like the Air Force, the Navy has been substantially engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, though primarily in a supporting role. Also, the Navy continues to maintain worldwide commitments to engage allies and friends, while projecting power with her highly capable, yet aging surface and subsurface fleets. A primary focus of this power projection has been the Persian Gulf, in an effort to ensure access to oil supplies in the region, while Iran continues to telegraph bellicose signals. Based on budget pressure, the service continues to selectively divest itself of aging ships, including eleven in fiscal year 2013. 44 With the aim of recapitalizing aging equipment and meeting emerging threats, the Navy is procuring ships and submarines in limited numbers, such as the Littoral Combat Ship and Virginia class submarines. 45 Additionally, the Navy is continuing to procure various tactical aircraft such as F/A-18E/F models, and the F-35.
In order to meet the demands of Asia-Pacific rebalancing, the Navy is changing the balance of ships with homeports in the Pacific to 60% of the fleet by 2020. 46 Furthermore, the Navy/Marine Corps team continues to further refine amphibious warfare concepts, as evident by the "Single Naval Battle" concept. 47 The rebalancing coupled with existing acquisition projects will make the Navy eminently more capable worldwide and more able to effectively develop then employ Air-Sea Battle.
The current Marine Corps narrative is relatively static and enduring: the story of a proud fighting force, amphibious in character, maintaining the highest readiness to deploy and employ on short notice in support of national objectives. The Marines occupy a relatively small piece of the DOD budget, at approximately 8%, while occupying the niche as America's "crisis response force." 48 This does not infer the Marines are a second land army, nor can it be with its relatively small size and limited staying power in terms of logistics. 49 With a constant afloat presence of three
Amphibious Ready Groups and the corresponding embarked Marine Expeditionary
Units/Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, these provide America a continuous forwarddeployed force in being, ensuring strategic reach and mobility for decisive operations.
The Marine Corps has been heavily tasked in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unlike the Army, the looming Marine force structure cuts will be less dramatic, and require fewer hard choices about capabilities that may be cut. The service will decrease its numbers from 202,000 to 182,100, returning to approximate pre-9/11 force levels. 50 However, its forces will retain their amphibious specialty and unique partnership with the Navy. The
Asia-Pacific rebalancing is favorable for the Marines and their traditional focus on Asia.
Additionally, refinement of concepts like Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Shipto-Objective-Maneuver position the service well for contribution to Air-Sea Battle, 13 focusing on two unique Marine contributions: "distributed ground maneuver, and dispersed aviation basing and employment." 51 Continued purchases of CV-22 and F-35 aircraft are providing necessary, timely upgrades to Marine Corps capabilities.
The present Army narrative is perhaps the most complicated of the service narratives to dissect and disseminate. In the wake of disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army stands to reduce its active-duty personnel numbers from 562,000
to 490,000, and perhaps further. 52 Based on the pending drawdown, the service seeks to maintain tailorable, scalable (and reversible) landpower forces capable across a wide-range of competencies in order to be able to "prevent, shape and win" in an uncertain future. 53 Underpinning the overall narrative is the Army (and joint-service)
concern that force structure cuts do not ever result in another Task Force SMITH. 
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Whither Air-Sea Battle?
Military strategy must be nested in national grand strategy. In the globalized world of the 21st century, the economic element of power (way) arguably offers more impact on nation-state actors, than raw military power. 59 But, the economic element may not provide the same level of inducement or coercion to non-state actors. Whether U.S.
foreign policy is activist or more cautious in the future, the military element of power will remain integral to maintaining U.S. domestic and international interests. However, maintaining and reinforcing these interests comes at a cost, monetarily and in terms of risk. The American government and her people need to articulate what capabilities they want and can afford from her military; for example, overwhelming majority, parity, risk of inferiority, or equilibrium. The Air-Sea Battle concept and capabilities "deemed necessary" must be refined by the NCA. In turn, the service or government agency that can best articulate "as deemed necessary" will be favorably postured for employment and the future budget battles concerning the concept. Air-Sea Battle should inform U.S.
strategy, but the A2/AD threat it proposes to mitigate is not the sole threat the U.S. will face. Hence, Air-Sea Battle is but one employment option or imperative for the NCA. Army and Marine Corps representatives working part-time. 62 The personnel who comprise the office are taken from service staff manning, meaning they are not a joint organization resourced via eJMAPS. 63 Because of this, the office works under the principle of "consensus," without benefit of one joint boss. 64 Of significance, the Air-Sea Similarly, an earnest debate on the future structure of Army maneuver forces is necessary given that A2/AD is but one challenge in an uncertain world. Air-Sea Battle telegraphs America's intentions and capabilities, perhaps in an intended manner, but also in unintended manners. In addition to the stated U.S. national security policies, academia, public and private think tanks perform the necessary role of advancing differing views in the American democracy. The government cannot restrain these organizations, meaning they may telegraph widely varying messages to various constituencies, internal and external to the U.S, making the "say-do" gap between words and actions challenging to harmonize. But, this lack of restraint serves a useful purpose, allowing informed, reasoned debate without excessive governmental dissonance. The Air-Sea Battle narrative is not unified and somewhat incoherent because it is a relatively new concept, and since the A2/AD threats the concept seeks to overcome are not universally held as threats by the U.S. national leadership.
In the short-to-medium-term, the state of relative equilibrium may be the U.S.'s desired worldwide status quo. Equilibrium is defined "as a condition in which all acting influences are canceled by others, resulting in a stable, balanced or unchanging system." 69 Maintaining or restoring order in a dynamic world that does not have consistent order, opens the possibilities of increased interdependence on U.S. regional allies, partners and friends. Quite simply, equilibrium may be favorable to U.S. interests, allowing her to maintain influence, and at least military parity, without suffering from national overreach of her interests or military forces. Equilibrium may induce increased U.S. risk in certain areas of the world, which must be actively managed. Air-Sea Battle represents a possible contribution to equilibrium and must be only part of the overall discussion on desired joint force structure and capabilities, realistically matching ends, ways and means.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Air-Sea Battle concept can be to serve as a forcing function for the American public and national leadership to engage in a reasoned, unemotional debate on the future of military force structure. This intellectual capital expended in peacetime should assist in enabling success in the event of war.
Furthermore, Air-Sea Battle enhances joint-service cooperation, enhancing existing 20 synergies and relationships, without a panoply of exquisite new weapon systems. 70 The military element of power has been the stalwart of American power in the post-Cold War world. To assume the U.S. military will be the most effective and dominant element of power in the future is naïve and dangerous. Air-Sea Battle will be part of the U.S.
defense narrative, but only as a larger part of the discussion on strategy.
Conclusion
Even with the swirling uncertainty of future defense budgets, the Air-Sea Battle concept is worthy of consideration as a contributing way for U.S. strategy. This author's assertion is Air-Sea Battle is a timely, necessary component of the overall U.S. strategic and defense narratives. At its core, Air-Sea Battle is about cross-domain access to the battlespace, ensuring U.S. freedom of maneuver, decision space and possibly deterring adversary actions. The concept will enable strategic reach, operational flexibility and maneuver space for the joint force, if called upon by the NCA to achieve objectives in support of national grand strategy. Nonetheless, fundamental questions about the concept's utility have yet to be answered. Air-Sea Battle assists in hedging against future threats presented by nation-state and non-state actors. But, it remains to be seen whether Air-Sea Battle is transitory or a lasting part of U.S. defense strategy.
Ultimately, Air-Sea Battle is a joint-service solution, which excludes individual service capability and force structure at the risk of failure to achieve and maintain required access, and hence the ability to secure U.S. national interests throughout the spectrum of conflict. Incurring risk entails making calculated trade-offs, allowing for more capabilities in some areas and less in others. Risks must be captured and communicated to U.S. national leaders so that they may make informed, reasoned 21 decisions on U.S. force structure. Part of the Air-Sea Battle portfolio includes materiel solutions, which may be necessary and cost prohibitive at the same time. Any military concept or strategy must be affordable to the nation. Fortunately, many of Air-Sea
Battle's solutions are beyond the materiel realm, utilizing all aspects of the DOTMLPF.
The Air-Sea Battle concept is an important contribution to the defense debate and narrative. But, its narrative resonates in different sectors, to a wide variety of constituents and stakeholders. The U.S. Congress will play a critical role in funding necessary elements of Air-Sea Battle. Yet, with an incomplete narrative, which lacks unity among the services, securing the purchasing power of the Congress may be challenging. The services must present a unified perspective on the merits of Air-Sea
Battle if the concept is to inform national strategy (ends), and impact potential ways and means. The U.S. defense industrial base also has an important role to play in the feasibility and affordability of the concept. Finally, the U.S. must continue to reassure allies and partners, while shaping and deterring the behavior of potential adversaries.
This monograph examined the Air-Sea Battle concept through the lens of national strategy, focusing on the concept's implications for the defense narrative to include strategy, force structure, the defense industrial base and corresponding budget impacts for the future. This study scoped background, assumptions, current national guidance, where the narrative resides by service, and recommendations for the future Air-Sea Battle narrative, to include how it should inform U.S. national grand strategy, future force structure, defense expenditures, and engagement with allies and partners.
Air-Sea Battle is an important concept, worthy of examination and more importantly, worthy of debate, as the U.S. seeks to chart its future after more than a decade of war.
